\ s-^ I 

T~' 

THE FEDERAL COURTS. 



SPEECH 


OF 

HON. GEORGE D. ROBINSON, 

OF MASSACHUSETTS, 


IN THE 

HOUSE OF KEPEESENTATIVES, 


FEBEXJAKT 12, 1880. 



WASHINGTON. 

1880. 










SPEECH 


OF 

HON. GEOEGE D. EO BINS ON. 


The House having under consideration the bill (H. E. No. 3543) to amend sections 
1, 2, 3, and 10 of an act to determine the jurisdiction of the circuit court of the 
United States, and for other purposes, approved March 3, 1875— 

Mr. ROBINSON said: 

Mr. Speaker : I hesitate somewhat to ask the attention of the 
House to-day to remarks upon this bill because it has been discussed 
by so many gentlemen that possibly the whole ground has been cov¬ 
ered and all the objections to it have been stated or suggested by the 
gentlemen who.have already addressed the House. I know that it is 
very difficult to secure the attention of this House when a debate 
has run for some days in the morning hour; but, Mr. Speaker, it 
becomes my duty to say some things different from the views uttered 
by gentlemen who have preceded me; and I could not, in justice to 
myself, be silent under such circumstances. 

I agree, I say, at the outset, with many of the features of the pro¬ 
posed bill. I think it wise to turn back somewhat toward the legis¬ 
lation of 1789, founded on the constitutional provisions. I agree 
with many gentlemen there are provisions in the act of 1875 which 
are not called for at the present time; and I trust the future is far 
distant when the condition of the country will require their enforce¬ 
ment. 

I shall not touch much at length on points which have been elab¬ 
orated, and points in which I agree. I say at once that the right of 
removal of causes ought to be restricted as it is in this bill, mainly, 
to the defendant. I say that the plaintiff should not have, under 
ordinary circumstances, a right to elect his forum in a State, and 
afterward, when he finds defeat is hanging over him, at the last mo¬ 
ment, to change his forum and take the United States court instead. 
It is wise to strike out that privilege for the plaintiff. 

Again, I do not quite agree with the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. 
•Barber] who spoke yesterday in objection to the clause relating to 
promissory notes. If we enact the bill as it stands now, with that 
provision in it, we shall have returned to the law as it was before 
1875, as it has been from 1789 down to 1875, and I agree that ought 
to be done. If we in ninety years of experience, under that legisla¬ 
tion, found no practical difficulty, certainly I cannot see that in the 
experience of the last five years we have had justification for that 
departure from the old way. 

I may as well say here that as this bill does not touch in general 
terms the powers given to the circuit courts in regard to patents, 
copyrights, civil rights, elective franchise, or criminal prosecutions. 



4 


I dismiss those features without comment, having no desire to take 
up the time of the House unnecessarily. But there are two other 
features in the hill to which I cannot give my approval for which I 
cannot vote. I shall speak of them in order. In the first place the 
clause raising the limit of jurisdiction from |500 to $2,000. That has 
not been commented on at length. The proposition is to change the 
law as it has been from 1789 to the present time. To this very clay 
and hour the limit is $500. Up to this time, through all the excite¬ 
ments conse.fiuent upon the war, upon the conflict of interests in¬ 
volved in the varied industries and business of this country, we have 
gone on under that rule, and we have come out of the darkness into 
the light of prosperity and success, and are on the onward march. 
There is no demand, then, that we should go up from $500 to $2,000. 

Gentlemen will understand that it wnll not affect the number of 
causes which will come into the Supreme Court of the United States, 
because that right is limited by another statute, which fixes the 
amount at $5,000. So with regard to the flow of business from the 
circuit court into the Supreme Court, it is utterly immaterial whether 
the amount fixed in the circuit court shall be $500 or $2,000, because 
neither one of itself gives the right of transfer to the Supreme Court. 
There can be no discussion about that. 

And, on this question, what is the demand we should raise the limit 
from $500 to $2,000 ? What reason has been given for it in this de¬ 
bate ? Said the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Culberson] who opened 
this debate, in speaking of the clause in regard to promissory notes: 

The enlargement of the jurisdiction of those courts by the exception contained 
in the act of 1875 has operated to increase largely the business of the circuit and 
Supreme Courts of the United States, and no subject of litigation has contributed 
more to swell and overload the dockets of the courts than the jurisdiction over 
negotiable instruments held by assignees. This supply of business should be cut 
off and the holders of such evidences of debt remitted to the coui’ts of the States, 
which now have concurrent jurisdiction. 

And now mark these words, Mr. Speaker: 

I do not think, Mr. Speaker, that if Congress had been devising a method by 
which to block up business in the circuit courts, to increase the burdens and ex¬ 
penses of litigation and at the same time prepare an easy mode by which the gravest 
frauds could be practiced ui)on the jurisdiction of the courts, it could have adopted 
a more successful one. 

And I agree with him. And what is the logical conclusion of that ? 
It is this plainly, that when you have taken away the right to go 
into the circuit court of the United States as the assignee of a chose 
in action, except foreign bills of exchange, you have then swept down 
that great mass of causes which have been accumulating in the cir¬ 
cuit court. You have removed the great bulk, you have gone back 
to the condition of things in 1875. Gentlemen should not lose sight 
of this condition of things. 

These causes have been very numerous, they have been burdensome 
to the country, and made so by the litigation in the United States 
courts, and I only dwell longer to say I heartily agree in the provision 
to strike that out of the law of 1875. And I say that when we have 
struck that out we have the relief that it is said we ought to have 
by striking it out. Strike it out, says the gentleman, because that 
provision has burdened the courts. I say strike it out and the burden 
drops from the courts. 

Right here I will refer to the criticism made by the gentleman from 
Indiana [Mr. Baker] a few days ago. I do not see him now in his 
seat. I do not wish to misrepresent him. 

A Member. He is present. 


Mr. ROBINSON”. I wish to say something in regard to his proposed 
amendment that the limit should be in some way more sharply de- 
iined. I have no objection that the language should be made so clear 
that no one can err. But while he states that he has known cases in 
which actions have been brought in the circuit court of the United 
States upon notes of the value of $20 I must take issue with him. I 
cannot of course contradict liis statement or question what he states 
to this House, but under the provisions of the law I fail to see how 
it can be accomplished. 

Mr. BAKER rose. 

Mr. ROBINSON. The gentleman will later have time to explain it. 

Mr. BAKER rose. 

Mr. ROBINSON. Not in my time. I will not be unfair with you. 

Mr. BAKER. I trust I shall have some time to make some obser¬ 
vations on that subject. 

Mr. ROBINSON. If there is any abuse of this provision, if it be 
found that a party has removed a cause to the circuit court when he 
has no right to have it there, the gentleman and all other gentlemen 
know that the statute provides that the circuit court shall remand 
that cause. 

Mr. BAKER. I said nothing about removal. I was talking about 
the institution of the suit originally in the'Federal courts under the 
claim of $500 damages where the real cause of action as it finally 
turned out amounted to only twenty or twenty-five dollars. 

Mr. ROBINSON. The gentleman will find provisions to meet those 
difficulties in the statutes—provisions giving the court power to im¬ 
pose costs ; yes, double costs, and even terms in addition to that upon 
a party who brings his case wrongfully in the circuit court of the 
United States. 

Now, we have considered this one point thus far, how the business 
of the court will be diminished by the removal of this one provision 
from the act. Is there a demand we shall go further ? Is there a de¬ 
mand that we shall have no United States courts that shall adjudi¬ 
cate upon the rights of parties, citizens of different States ? I think 
not. Events are so fresh and so powerful in their instruction that it 
will not be found in this House that it has a standing here, that we 
are to dismiss the national power—dismiss the national courts and 
ignore their usefulness. We want to maintain them. We are here 
to-day with a Union more strongly cemented than ever before, and 
destined to be perpetual. That Union is not by the agreement of the 
States, but by the decree of the people of this great country, renewed, 
ratified, sanctified in the blood of the war. That is accomplished and 
with the United States court everywhere in this land I shall look 
in vain to find any gentleman rise and say he would banish them or 
shear them of their power. Nay, the lesson of the legislation in the 
last Congress and in this teaches us volumes as to the opinion of the 
people and the legislators here assembled. Why, in the Forty-fifth 
Congress we passed bills securing joint action, giving additional fa¬ 
cilities in the United States courts, establishing new courts, making 
new districts, and divisions of districts—in how, many States ? Why, 
in Colorado, the District of Columbia, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Mich¬ 
igan, Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, Ohio, and West Virginia. 
That in the Forty-fifth Congress. What is the record in the Forty- 
sixth ? Gentlemen have only to consult the files of the House. Go 
to the Committee on the Judiciary and you will find there bills in the 
same direction for Ohio, Indiana, Louisiana, Iowa, Mississippi, Ten¬ 
nessee, Illinois, South Carolina, Texas, Kentucky, North Carolina, 



G 


Missouri, New York, and Kansas. Does that legislation show that the 
people tire of the pressure of the national power and the authority of 
the Federal courts ? While I would not divulge the secrets of the 
consultation of the committee-room, yet I feel that I may say to this 
House that in the discussions and testimony before us in regard to 
the establishment of a circuit court in a certain State in this Union 
it appeared that the people wanted the United States court there 
because they had more confidence in it than they had in their State 
courts. And I say further, so that the credit may go where it is due, 
that this was in one of the Southern States of this Union. 

I like that evidence. That is very gratifying. With this legisla¬ 
tion accomplished and proposed and with that feeling prevailing I 
receive any such expression as that with cordiality. Let us have then 
this recognition of the United States power, and let us see to it that 
we do not here strive to strip it of its authority. 

I need not enlarge, perhaps, upon the value and the interest of the 
cases that range from $500 up to $2,000 as that was so well put by the 
gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Barber] yesterday. Are we making a 
court bill that will only avail to persons who are worth $2,000 ? That 
is this bill. The people shall open the national courts; they shall 
pay for jurors and marshals and clerks and judges; they shall build 
court-houses here and there all over the broad land; you shall tax 
them for that burden; but this Congress undertakes to say that no 
man shall have the benefits of the judiciary of the United States—I 
speak in general terms—unless he has a cause of action that in value 
represents $2,000. From 17S9 for ninety years down we have been 
satisfied to let the people go in and out our national courts of justice 
for the sum of $500. What wrong came to the people of this country 
from that ? 

Apply what I say now more particularly to natural persons, to in¬ 
dividuals, and I think the force of the argument will be at once con¬ 
ceded. The other branch of the question I shall touch upon later. 
Take the loans of money that are made all over this country, and 
they are not alone from the East and the Middle States; they are 
made everywhere; transactions are growing up and multiplying every 
day that affect the entire community of the United States. Wrong, 
supremely wrong, is that man’s view who thinks by this legislation 
he will only affect the State of Massachusetts, the State of Connecti¬ 
cut, the State of Now York, and other of the old States of the East. 
Why, you gentlemen of the South will have transactions from $500 
to $2,000, many of them, which you wish to have passed upon in the 
Federal courts of this country. You will be debarred whatever your 
cause of action. You gentlemen of the West, as I believe, in the vain 
dream to get some relief from w'hat I think is a false delusion, are 
ready to throw down the benefits that you have under the provisions 
of the Constitution and the laws made in execution of the Constitu¬ 
tion, and to cast the benefits of your trade and your commerce and 
your credit into oblivion, never to be regained. 

There are, then, great questions involved in this bill. And I under¬ 
take to say, what is the experience of every man, that the individual 
who has only somewhere from $500 to $2,000 is a man who demands 
and should receive the protection of the United States courts quite 
as much as he who controls millions. 

Mr. HAMMOND, of Georgia. Why limit it to $500 ? 

Mr. ROBINSON. The gentleman asks me why I limit it to $500. 
I will reply by saying to him, why did our fathers limit it to $500 ? 
And I suppose that is the question he wants to ask me. There is no 


7 


reason founded upon the Constitution. The Constitution says that 
the judicial j)ower of the United States shall he vested in the Supreme 
Court and in such other inferior courts as Congress may establish. 
The Constitution further says that the judicial power shall extend to 
controversies between citizens of diiferent States. That is the point 
here. When the founders of that Constitution, or many of them, met 
in the Congress of the United States, and when they gave us the act 
of 1789, for some reason, we know not why, they said it might be well 
to fix the limit at $500. There is nothing that I can find in the debates 
of the House of Representatives of that period that gives the reason ; 
and there is nothing to be found in any report of the debates of the 
Senate, because the debates of the Senate were then had with closed 
doors and in secrecy. 

Mr. HAMMOND, of Georgia. Would not your argument destroy all 
limit as to amount ? 

Mr. ROBINSON. No, sir. My argument is not that we should go 
from $500 down to $1, and the House of Representatives has misunder¬ 
stood me if they thought I said so. What I say is this, that it is clearly 
within the constitutional power of Congress to provide that suits from 
$1 up between citizens of different States shall have cognizance in the 
Federal courts; and nobody will dispute that. From 1789 for ninety 
years the practice and experience of the country seemed to demon¬ 
strate the wisdom of the fathers in the legislation of 1789. I do not 
ask to go to the legitimate conclusion of distributing the power to the 
classes that have credits or demands of only a dollar. There is no 
stopping-place except in the discretion of Congress. This Congress 
has the discretion. I am not arguing the contrary, and gentlemen 
have not misunderstood me, I know. It is for us to say whether we 
think it wise and for the interest of the people that we should raise 
this limit from $500 to $2,000. That is what I am undertaking to 
meet. I say it is not wise; and if what I have said goes to sustain 
my assertion, I pass on, and leave it to other gentlemen to combat it. 
It is not that it is within the power of Congress merely, but that it is 
within its reasonable discretion as well, and I say no fact justifies the 
exercise of the discretion to give an enlarged limit. 

Mr. WEAVER. Will the gentleman permit me to ask him a ques¬ 
tion ? 

Mr. ROBINSON. I do not like to yield, because my time is limited 
and I have a good deal more to say. I prefer that gentlemen should 
not take up my time. 

Mr. WEAVER. I yielded to the gentleman when I had the floor,, 
but I will not insist upon it. 

Mr. ROBINSON. The gentleman was kind enough to yield to me, 
and I will now give one good turn for another, if his question is a 
short one. 

Mr. WEAVER. Does not the gentleman see that at the time of the 
organization of the Government and the passage of the judiciary act 
of 1789, taking into consideration the population of the country and 
the relative amount of business, $500 was a proper limit and brought 
a limited number of suits into the courts, and that the rapid increase 
of population and increase of business since that time would overload 
the courts if the $500 limit was retained ? 

Mr. ROBINSON. That has been touched upon by the gentleman 
from Michigan, [Mr. Willits.] While perhaps it may be very easy 
for the gentleman to say that $2,000 now does not renresent more 
than $500 represented some years ago- 

Mr. WEAVER. 1 do not say that. 


8 


Mr. ROBINSON. In a certain sense that may he true. But I tell 
you that the man who has to-day but a thousand dollars, and wants 
iiis rights inquired into and determined, cares more about the $1,000 
o<f his own than for the $1,000 that might have been in his grand¬ 
father’s pocket. We must recollect that we are legislating for the 
people of to-day. Is it right and discreet that we should take away 
from the people of this country the privilege of going into the United 
States courts for the determination of suits involving sums between 
$500 and $2,000 ? 

Mr. WEAVER. It is a necessity. 

Mr. ROBINSON. I deny that it is a necessity, because when we 
have stricken out the provision in regard to promissory notes, the 
great bulk of causes will go out of the courts, as I have already ar¬ 
gued. Again, we are multiplying United States courts and shall con¬ 
tinue to do so as this country grows and prospers. 

In regard to section 640 of the Revised Statutes, containing the 
provision in regard to corporations created by national laws, I will 
not dwell upon that at length, except to say that I can see no reason 
why a corporation created by authority of the United States should 
stand upon any better footing in this respect than any other corpora¬ 
tion. 

If a question arises under the Constitution or the laws of the United 
States, then that question should be interpreted and determined by 
the Supreme Court of the United States ; and there are now many 
provisions of law for that purpose. I think that the amendment of 
the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Culberson] is substantially in the 
right direction ; perhaps it is exactly so in terms. 

If the limit is kept at $500, as applied to all parties litigant, I am 
very clear that section 640 of the Revised Statutes should be repealed, 
and I hope the House will take that position. If it is said that it will 
be exceedingly troublesome to try in the United States courts the suits 
of national corporations involving small amounts, such as the destruc¬ 
tion of a few rods of fence or the loss or damage of some article of 
property, then take away those cases and place those corporations on 
an equality with other suitors. 

Right here it may be well for me to say that the criticism upon the 
action of the courts under the provision that allows an appeal to the 
Supreme Court when a question arises under the Constitution or the 
laws of the United States is not quite sound. Gentlemen will find 
by referring to 6 Otto, in the case cited yesterday by the gentleman 
from Missouri, [Mr. Philips,] that the court says that only those ques¬ 
tions can go to the Supreme Court which require the determination 
and construction of some provision of the Constitution of the United 
States or some law of the United States in order to arrive at a correct 
■decision of the case. These corporations are not permitted to go there 
merely because they have been incorporated by authority of the 
United States. 

I leave that branch of the subject, the question of the money limit, 
by asking gentlemen who hear me to consider for a moment that in 
this country the people are proportionately poor. Go into any State 
and you will find that the great mass of the people are utterly des¬ 
titute of property. They pay a tax, if at all, upon the poll, and not 
upon property. If any of these persons shall accumulate the sum 
of $1,000 1)y dint of labor and saving, his right to that everywhere 
throughout this land should be secure. 

I come now to the other provision of the bill, and in order that we 
cmay have it before the House I ask the Clerk to read that portion of 


9 


the bill referring to corporations contained in the last clause of sec¬ 
tion 3. 

The Clerk read as follows: 

Sec. 3. That section 3 of said act be, and the .same is hereby, amended so as to 
read as follows: 

* ****** 

“ That the circuit courts of the United States shall not take original cognizance 
of any suit of a civil nature, either at common law or in equity, between a corpo¬ 
ration created or organized by or under the laws of any State and a citizen of any 
State in which such corporation at the time the cause of action accrued may have 
been carrying on any business authorized by the law creating it, except in like 
cases in which said courts are authorized by this act to take original cognizance 
of suits between citizens of the same State. Nor shall any such suit between such 
a corporation and a citizen or citizens of a State in which it may be doing busi¬ 
ness, be removed to any circuit court of the United States, except in like cases in 
which such removal is authorized by the foregoing provision in suits between 
citizens of the same States.” 

Mr. ROBINSON. I propose now to pass to the consideration of that 
feature of the bill which has just been read, and which is sometimes 
called the corporation clause of the bill. At the outset I must say 
that I cannot agree with some gentlemen who have stated that that 
is the great object to be accomplished. I cannot give that statement 
my assent and approval. Let us examine this question. In passing 
I want to say that the provision there does not save rights as to re¬ 
moval in pending suits or oiiginal actions. The gentleman in charge 
of the bill will, I presume, give loroper consideration to this sugges¬ 
tion. 

Again, it was not intended by the gentleman who ollered this, as I 
understand, that corporations should be restricted as to suits for the 
enforcement of their rights under the patent or copyright laws. There 
can be no question that if this clause were adopted no corporation 
could go into the Federal court to enforce its rights under the patent 
or copyright laws, because this says “ except as authorized by the 
provisions of this act,” that is the act of 1875, which we are amend¬ 
ing. Now the authority to go into the United States courts to en¬ 
force the patent and cojiyright laws is not found in the act of 187.5, 
but in the Revised Statutes, section 629, clause 9. 

Mr. NEW. That jurisdiction is exclusively in the circuit courts. 

Mr. ROBINSON. Yes, sir; and we should not disturb it and for the 
reason that not only in the judgment of Congress heretofore but iu 
the decisions of the Supreme Court there should prevail over this 
country one uniform line of decision and adjudication upon questions 
of this kind. I need not argue the matter. There are many cases in 
which corporations will become interested in patents and copyrights, 
and have rights under them. 

Corporations have been held by the United States courts to be cit¬ 
izens of the States in which they are created. I need not read the 
decisions, because members of the House are familiar with this as a 
settled principle. In other words, to state it the other way, the court 
says that when a corporation comes into court the court will consider 
that cause as for or against the stockholders of that corporation, and 
for the purposes of jurisdiction they shall be conclusively presumed 
to be residents of the State iu which the corporation was created. 
That is the position of the court. It has been the adjudication of the 
court from the earliest cases. I need not cite them. The same rule 
will apply to alien corporations ; that is, corporations created in for¬ 
eign countries—not only iu foreign states, as we use the phrase. 

The Constitution, in ai^icle 3, extends the judicial power to citizens 
of different States. Therefore, in its language and by the adjudica- 



10 


tionof the courts it extends its power to corporations, for they are 
citizens of the different States. Have they that right under the Con¬ 
stitution ? It has been asserted, and is upheld by the Supreme Court, 
and of course it cannot be at the present time called in question. 

If, then, the citizens of different States have this right in the United 
States courts—and when I say citizens, I use the term in view of the 
adjudications of the Supreme Court and inelude corporations—if the 
corporations of this country, then, have the same right as natural per¬ 
sons to go into the courts of the United States, is it within the power 
of Congress to take that right away from them ? That is the ques¬ 
tion for our consideration. Can Congress deprive corporations of a 
right guaranteed to them by the Constitution as asserted and vindi¬ 
cated by the Supreme Court f 

I wish to refer the House to an early case in 1 Wheaton, the case 
of Martin vs. Hunter, in which the court uses the following language: 

Let this article be carefully weighed and considered. The language of this 
article throughout is manifestly designed to be mandatory upon the Legislature. 
Its obligatory force is so imperative that Congress could not, without a violation 
of its duty, have refused to carry it into operation. “ The .ludicial power of the 
United States shall be vested ” (hot may be vested) “ in one Sdpreme Court and in 
such inferior courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” 
Could Congress have lawfully refused' to create a Supreme Court, or vest in it con¬ 
stitutional jurisdiction 1 

^ * it -k ie -k it 

The judicial power must therefore he vested in some court by Congress ; and to 
suppose that it was not an obligation binding on them, but might, at their pleasure, 
be omitted or declined, is to suppose that, under the sanction of the Constitution, 
they might defeat the Constitution itself. A construction which would lead to 
such a result cannot be sound. 

★ * * * * * ★ 

If, then, it is the duty of Congress to vest the judicial power of the United States, 
it is a duty to vest the whole judicial power. The language if imperative as to 
one part is imperative as to all. If it were otherwise, this anomaly would exist, 
that Congress might successively refuse to vest the jurisdiction in any one class of 
cases enumerated in the Constitution and thereby defeat the jurisdiction as to all; 
for the Constitution has not singled out any class on which Congress are bound to 
act in preference to others. 

Mr. TUCKER. From what does the gentleman read ? 

Mr. ROBINSON. From 1 Wheaton. 

Mr. TUCKER. Whose opinion ? 

Mr. ROBINSON. The opinion of Judge Story; and if the gentle¬ 
man wants other authority to the same effect he will find in the 
opinion of Chief-Justice Marshall, in Cohens vs. Virginia, 6 Wheaton, 
which I will not take time to read, a reiteration of the same doctrine. 

I say, then, that those constitutional provisions give to the citizens 
of the different States their rights in the Federal courts. I say again 
it is not within the constitutional power of Congress to make dis¬ 
criminations as to citizens in this matter. It has been taken as set¬ 
tled that the corporations of the States for purposes of jurisdiction 
are citizens of the States in which they are created. If citizens, they 
have the rights of all other citizens; and Congress is bound to secure 
those rights by legislation. 

Can you discriminate ? Why, in the famous Dred Scott decision, the 
Suprerne Court did discriminate, and said that a negro was not a cit¬ 
izen within the meaning of the Constitution, nor entitled to sue in 
the circuit court of the United States ? The nation paused and held 
its breath, and never recovered itself until after the bloody strife of 
the war, when was put into the Constitution that guarantee that no 
such doctrine should ever be repeated in this country; and to-day it 
is impossible for any Supreme Court to make that discrimination 
again. * 


11 


That, I believe, is the only discrimination against the citizen that 
was ever attempted. It took us years to correct it; it cost blood and 
treasure.^ That is well settled. I am discussing simply the question 
of jurisdiction, not any other provision of the Constitution. 

Discriminate ! Can this Congress, can you here ? I think no one 
will claim it. Can you say here that the corporations, for instance, 
of the State of New York, created there and doing business there, 
shall not be citizens of New York, but shall be citizens of the various 
States wherever they may go and transact business ? No, indeed. 
That is not within the power of this Congress. Can you say that I, 
a citizen of Massachusetts, shall not be a citizen of Massachusetts 
when I want to come to the United States court, but shall be a citi¬ 
zen of Louisiana, or it may be of Ohio, or it may be of Illinois ? Cer¬ 
tainly not. Can you say by your legislation that the State of Massa¬ 
chusetts, for instance, shall have no rights in the circuit court, that 
the citizens of Massachusetts shall have no rights in the circuit court ? 
Why, not at all. 

“ Citizens,’’ say the constitutions of the different States, and that, I 
am happy to say, includes the i)eople of the State of Massachusetts. 
Then you will not attempt that. And so this bill does not limit and 
say that directly, but seeks to gain by indirection what it has not the 
courage and the power to do directly. That is what it tries to do. 
If gentlemen believe it is in the power of Congress to legislate citi¬ 
zenship out of the different individuals, whether natural or artificial, 
that is recognized under the Constitution, let them meet that ques¬ 
tion fairly. 

If Congress can exclude the citizens of a locality, or the citizens 
of one color, or the citizens of one occupation, or the citizens of cer¬ 
tain classes of wealth or industry, surely it can exclude any other 
citizens. If you can, in this bill and under our Constitution, declare 
that the citizens, or any portion of them, in this country, because 
they act in their corporate capacity, shall lose their rights in the 
Federal courts, it is but the next step to legislate that the man who 
is engaged in rolling iron, or in the manufacture of cotton or of 
woolen goods, or is a banker or ‘‘bloated bondholder,” shall not have 
any rights in the Federal courts. There is no stop between them. 

“Well, but this bill,” it will be said, “ does not declare that they shall 
not be citizens.” And it may be said that this Congress certainly has 
the power to decline to exercise the whole of its jurisdiction; that 
the Supreme Court has recognized that as within the discretion and 
power of Congress. So the court has, but I ask you to observe that 
the court has never given any countenance, except in the case I have 
referred to, that upon this matter of jurisdiction there may be any 
discrimination as to citizens. There may be a discrimination as to 
subject-matter, but not as to citizens. 

The gentleman from Indiana [Mr. New] has cited Sheldon vs. Sill, 
8 Howard, 441, and other cases, in justification, as he seems to be¬ 
lieve, for the provision now under discussion. But all those cases 
are in point only to sustain the authority of Congress to exercise its 
discretion upon the subject-matter or amount in controversy, not to 
discriminate against any citizen. The distinction is very broad, and 
in recognition of it my argument is made. The opinions of courts 
have no binding force"whatever, except upon the precise points in 
issue. 

Corporations are citizens for all purposes under the Constitution 
and laws of the United States relating to the Federal courts, and as 
such have equal rights. It is not material in this consideration that 


12 


they are declared not to he citizens under other clauses of the Consti¬ 
tution and for <litferent purposes. 

The SPEAKER pro ietnpore, (Mr. Haukis, of Virginia, in the chair.) 
The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. ROBINSON. I think not, Mr. Speaker; but that I am to take 
up the whole morning hour. 

The SPEAKER iuo tejapore. The gentleman had twenty minutes 
yesterday aiid was entitled only to forty minutes this morning. 

Mr. WILLITS. I hope by unanimous consent the gentleman will 
be y)ermitted to proceed until he concludes his speech. 

Mr. Wx4.IT. I move that the gentleman be allowed to go on and 
finish his remarks. 

Mr. ROBINSON. It will be agreeable, I think, to the gentleman 
from Kentucky who is to follow me, to begin to-morrow, rather than 
for the few minutes remaining of the morning hour. 

Mr. TUCKER. I move that the gentleman be allowed to go on for 
the remainder of the morning hour. 

Several Members. Go on ; go on. 

There was no objection, and it was ordered accordingly. 

Mr. ROBINSON. Mr. Speaker, I am under obligation to the House 
for its courtesy, and I will not trespass on it. I vras saying that this 
bill did not do its work directly, but sought to do it indirectly. 
What does this bill say ? Not flatly and plainly, as some perhaps 
would have it, that these corporations shall forfeit their citizenship ; 
but it says we will close the doors of the United States courts against 
this class of citizens. Is that any more manly? Is that any more 
honorable ? Is that any more within the constitutional power of 
Congress ? Shut your doors ! We tore dov/n the ydacard “ no negroes 
here; ” shall we now write over the vestibule no corporations can 
be heard.” Why, if you say the circuit court shall not consider the 
causes which may come from one class of citizens, you may go on to 
classify your litigation to suit the prevailing temper of Congress, and 
you may in this Congress provide the circuit court shall not hear a 
black man, and in the next place you may provide the black man 
may be heard but no gentleman from South Carolina shall be heard. 
I need not enlarge further. 1 have submitted the point with con¬ 
fidence in its soundness. 

And I go further. Whether or not it is sound in law, it is emi¬ 
nently fair and wise in comity and statesmanship. Let us look at 
the status of this matter. What are corporations? Creations of 
vStates—local creatures born of the parent States. They have their 
home in the States of their creation, and they are hedged and bounded 
in their power by the territorial limits of the States creating them. 
Why, the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Weaver] wandered far when 
he said, the other day, in these words : 

Take for illustration a railroad corporation. It is organized, perhaps, under the 
law of Massachusetts. It stretches its iron arms westward until it reaches the 
Missouri River, passing through the great States of Xew York, Pennsylvania, 
Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, and perhaps others. It enters these States, and by 
the right of eminent domain condemns the property of the citizen, proceeds to 
build and lay the foundation of a colossal fortune. It builds its road and occupies 
the territory, and proposes to occupy for all future time. 

Why, Mr. Speaker, that is eloquence, but it is not law. I want to 
say, and the gentleman knows well, that no Massachusetts corpora¬ 
tion can go into Iowa and exercise the right of eminent domain ex¬ 
cept with the authority of the great State of Iowa. 

Mr. WEAVER. Let me make this remark. They do doit by indi¬ 
rection. 


13 


Mr. ROBINSON. I cannot yield. 

Mr. WEAVER. It will not come out of your time, and the gentle¬ 
man should not misreiireseut me. 

Mr. ROBINSON. It will come out of my time, as the morning hour 
has nearly expired. 

No corporation, as we all know, can go outside of the limits of its 
State and enter another State, except by the authority of the State 
which it will enter, whatever n)ay be its business. Eminent domain ! 
Why, that is the high prerogative of the sovereignty of the State 
which holds the territory, and that State may, in its discretion, part 
with it or apportion it to such objects and yuirposes as commend them¬ 
selves to its best judgment. So Legislatures give to great corpora¬ 
tions organized for the public benefit, as the Legislatures believe, the 
right to take laud. I need not defend railroad corporations; they 
have their defenders in this House. Gentlemen who have practiced 
at the bar for years as attorneys of corporations know that, senti¬ 
ment aside, there are rights on one side as well as rights on the other. 
Railroad corporations! Why, you take the great lines across this 
country ; take them as they come to this capital; take, for instance, 
the Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore Railroad. Pennsyl¬ 
vania, Delaware, and Maryland all joined to give consolidation, force, 
and vigor to that corporation ; and the State of Pennsylvania, by its 
supreme court, said in a case of that character that when the Legis¬ 
latures of the different States had authorized a consolidation of that 
kind, it was not to be taken as an act of one State with the corpora¬ 
tion alone, but was in the nature of a compact; and that the differ¬ 
ent States were bound to maintain that compact, not only with re¬ 
spect to the corporation but with respect to each other. You rejoice, 
some of you, in the great line that will take you to Chicago, if that 
will be effected by consolidation. The State of Iowa has but a single 
home corporation that crosses or runs within its border, I understand. 
And how came the great ones there ?. By the act of the Legislature 
of Iowa, by its consolidation statute, which said to the corporations 
approaching its borders, “ Come, we want the convenience and the 
power and the facilities and value of your combined line.” 

It has been well said here that this country, however much some 
men may talk against the corporation power, cannot get along with¬ 
out associated capital. No individual alone can undertake these 
enterprises. No man would dare to risk his fortune in such great 
undertakings. The people, wherever they are, who have been living 
hundreds of miles out of the sound of the locomotive’s shriek will 
always welcome the iron horse when he comes into their locality. 
Why, sir, in these di.scussions about United States courts, how ready 
gentlemen have been to tell us how many railroads they have run¬ 
ning to this and that town, and how the xieopie are benefited and the 
courts accommodated! 

I pass on. Savings banks and trust companies are organized in 
many of the States. They are authorized to loan their funds, many 
of them, outside of the borders of the State in which they exist. 
That is not so in Massachusetts, but it is so in many States. Are sav¬ 
ings banks rich corporations ? They are the trust companies, the 
trust establishments of the poor peoxde of the States. You examine 
their accounts, and you find them, from $1 up to |1,000, composed of 
the slow and painful earnings of the people in the shops and the 
mills or on the farms of the States that have fostered those institu¬ 
tions. Suppose they lend their funds in the West or the South; sup¬ 
pose they lend them in New York or elsewhere; I say they ought to 


14 


have the rights of the citizens who have saved their money and in¬ 
trusted them to the oiScers of those corporations. In nearly all eases 
the officers of those corporations serve without pay. 

But there are foreign insurance companies; gentleman say, they 
are the trouble. Well, let us see. Is that real or is it fancied ? How 
come the foreign insurance companies in any State ? I mean the foreign 
insurance companies of this country, foreign as to the State in which 
they do business. Unless a State by express act or by implied recog¬ 
nition allows an insurance company to do business within its border’s 
it has no right there—I mean a foreign insurance company. The 
States have regulated that. Ohio has its law; Indiana has its law; 
Wisconsin, Michigan, Massachusetts, New York, Connecticut, and 
nearly all the other States make provisions for those corporations to 
come. They provide that they shall come in and make certain depos¬ 
its ; that they shall have an agent upon whom process shall be served; 
they make such provisions as they choose, and the corporation must 
abide by those conditions, provided that they are not repugnant to 
the Constitution and laws of the United States. When the State of 
Wisconsin exacted from a foreign insurance company as a condition 
of its doing business in that State an agreement that it would not 
remove any cause to the circuit court of the United States the Su¬ 
preme Court of the United States put its hand on that legislation and 
said, that is repugnant to the Constitution and laws of the United 
States and the company may remove its cause. I refer to 20 Wall., 
445, Home Insurance Company vs. Morse. But when the same State 
of Wisconsin, as the next step, revoked the license of a foreign insur¬ 
ance company for a similar act and that question came to the Supreme 
Court of the United States, the court said, Wisconsin has the power 
to give license and she has the power to revoke it. I cite Doyle vs. 
Continental Insurance Compauy, 4 Otto, 535. 

Other States, as Missouri, have attempted legislation perhaps more 
dangerous. Indiana has gone a step further. Less than a year ago, 
in March last, the State of Indiana passed a law in which it provided 
that if a foreign insurance company shall remove a cause from the 
State court into the Federal court under the United States Constitu¬ 
tion and laws it shall forfeit its right to its real estate and to its 
liens and to its contracts, and that the contract, while not binding 
upon the individual unless he chooses to have it, shall be binding 
upon the corporation. That is Indiana legislation in this same hue. 
The act is as follows: 

An act touching foreign corporations, and proviciing that certain acts thereof shall 

work forfeiture. 

[Approved March 15, 1879.J 

Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Indiana, That 
every foreign corporation now doing or transacting, or that shall hereafter do or 
transact any business in this State, or acquire any right, title, interest in, or lien 
upon real estate in this State, that shall transfer or cause to be transferred from 
any court of this State to any court of the United States, save by regular coui'se of 
appeal, after trial in the State courts, any action commenced by or against such 
corporation in any court of this State, by or against any citizen or resident thereof, 
or that shall commence in any court of the United States in this State on any con¬ 
tract made in this State, or liability accrued therein, any suit or action against any 
citizen or resident of the State of Indiana, shall thereby forfeit all right and au¬ 
thority to do or transact business in this State, or hold real property or liens thereon, 
and all contracts between such corporations and citizens, or residents of tliis State, 
made after the passage of this act, shall be rendered void, as in favor of such cor¬ 
poration, but enforceable by such citizen at his election. 

Sec. 2. The provisions of this act shall be, and the same are hereby, made con¬ 
ditions upon which such corporations may be authorized to do business in this 
State, or hold title to or liens on real estate therein. 


Sec. 3. There being now no law of this State covering the provisions of this act, 
therefore an emergency exists, and the same shall be in force from and after its 
passage. 

The Legislature of Indiana considered there was such a public 
emergency that they had that act by its terms take effect on its pas¬ 
sage. The very instant the governor of the great State of Indiana 
wrote his sign-manual upon that act every corporation from another 
State doing business in Indiana was subject to that legislation. Is 
it constitutional? I think not. And is there any cause for wonder 
that any attempt to remit citizens of other States to the courts of 
Indiana controlled by the sentiments and policy expressed in such 
legislation is viewed with alarm ? 

I have only to say a word or two further and then I will close. I 
have said the States may exclude corporations. We all know that. 
And with such power in the States let their Legislatures exercise it 
as they may deem best. Surely Congress should not, by any policy 
that is unAvise or unsound, attempt to impose conditions or restric¬ 
tions that the States do not establish. Again, money may be loaned 
the towns and cities and counties throughout this country. And is 
it not fresh in your recollection that a good many of your towns and 
cities have seen fit to deny the obligation of loans made to them ? 
And was it not best and right that the citizen of another State, nat¬ 
ural or artificial, whether from the West, the South, or the East, 
should have the right to go into the United States court to try the 
question whether a certain county should pay its debts rather than 
go into the courts of that county ? This bill says if you lend money 
to the town or city or county, and you are a non-resident of that 
State and a corporation, you shall seek your remedy against the town 
or city or county in its own court at the hands of its own people, who 
are to pay the taxes and take the law from the judges who sit on the 
bench elected by the votes of the people who pay the taxes, voted 
for generally by the defendants in the cases, and who expect to be 
elected next time, sometimes because they make this decision or the 
other that may suit the popular whim. 

I will not apply that to the West only. In all parts of the country 
there occur times of excitement. You say that if a corporation shall 
go into a State to do business, let it abide by the law of the people 
where it seeks to do business. Yes, gentlemen, in times of peace and 
harmony and when there is no prejudice or excitement. But no State 
is always free from that. Massachusetts has had its periods of jeal¬ 
ousy and xirejudice; and there have been times in my recollection 
when some gentlemen of the South, if they belonged to incorx)orated 
companies, could not have gone to Massachusetts and submitted their 
cases to the State juries and obtained the judgments that they ought 
to have obtained on the law and the facts. 

And in the West there have been granger laws and granger excite¬ 
ments that have led peojile to commit enormities in legislation and 
extravagances in practice; and in the South—why, sir, history is too 
full for me to particularize. 

Cajutal is needed to restore the waste places of the South and to 
build up the undeveloped West; it must ffow largely from the older 
States of the East and from foreign lands. But it will not be risked 
in the perils of sectional bitterness, narrow prejudices, or local indif¬ 
ference to integrity and honor. 

I say, then, let us stand by the national courts; let us preserve 
their x)ower. Let us take out of those courts the causes of litigation 
that have multiplied and burdened the court and weighed it down, 



so that it may transact its business. But let us stand upon the legis¬ 
lation which the country has prospered under, which it has approved 
by its ninety years of life. Let us give our Constitution that con¬ 
struction which the fathers gave it that we may indeed be not merely 
a community of States. Let us ho more in practice talk of State 
rights as against the power of the Government or against the rights 
of the citizens of the nation. Let iis have a national power, national 
rights; and let us have individual interests and rights recognized 
under the Constitution and the laws of this great Government. 

^ I am under great obligations to the House for its kind attention. 


c 


